In [2, 17, 4] it has been shown that quantum resources can allow us to achieve a family of equilibria that can have sometimes a better social welfare, while guaranteeing privacy. We use graph games to propose a way to build non-cooperative games from graph states, and we show how to achieve an unlimited improvement with quantum advice compared to classical advice.
Introduction
An important tool in analysing games is the concept of Nash equilibrium [16] , which represents situations where no player has incentive to deviate from their strategy. This corresponds to situations observed in real life, with applications in economics, sociology, international relations, biology, etc. All equilibria do not have the same social welfare, i.e. the average payoff is different from one equilibrium to another. Games of incomplete information can exhibit better equilibria if players use a resource -a general correlation, Q. Such correlation can be viewed as a resource produced by a mediator to give advice to the players. The concept of advice generalizes the notion of Nash equilibrium to a broader class of equilibria [3] . All such equilibria can be classified according to the properties of the resource correlation. Three classes can be identified in addition to Nash equilibria (no correlation), namely general communication equilibria (Comm) [8] , where Q is unrestricted, belief-invariant equilibria (BI) [9, 10, 13, 14] and correlated equilibria (Corr) [3] . The canonical versions of these equilibria form a sequence of nested sets within the set of canonical correlations:
Nash ⊂ Corr ⊂ BI ⊂ Comm.
It was demonstrated that there exist games where BI equilibria can outperform Corr equilibria [17] (in terms of a social welfare (SW) of a game) as well as games where BI equilibria outperform any non-BI equilibria.
Winter at al. [2] introduce quantum correlated equilibria as a subclass of BI equilibria and show that quantum correlations can achieve optimal SW. This provides the link with quantum nonlocality, where quantum resources are used to produce non-signalling correlations. In this context, belief invariance describes the largest class of correlations that obey relativistic causality.
A characteristic feature of belief-invariance is that it ensures privacy -the other players involved in the game have no infomation about the input one player sent to the resource.
To obtain the canonical form of the games, [15] show that one can suppose that the output of the correlation resource is the answer the players give by delegating the extra computation (from game question to input to the box and from output of the box to players' answer) to the mediator. Therefore, quantum equilibria can be reached in a setting where players each measure quantum systems or, equivalently, by just having a central system providing advices by measuring a quantum device.
Ref. [2] highlights several open questions. In particular,
(1) Whether any full-coordination game (a.k.a. a non-local game in quantum physics and computer science communities) can be converted into a conflict-of-interests game. Ref. [17] gives an example of a two-player variant of the CHSH game, while [2] extends their result to an n-player game in which there exists a BI equilibrium which is better than any Corr equilibrium.
(2) How can we get a large separation between the expected payoff for the quantum and correlated equilibrium cases, and what is the upper bound for the separation? In the case of two-player full coordination games this question was settled in [6, 12] . Are there conflict-of-interest games which exhibit large separation?
In this paper, we provide a natural way to convert graph games (and more generally stabiliser games) into conflict-of-interest games, and we show how we can create unbounded separation by increasing the number of players or using penalty techniques (a negative payoff).
An interesting feature in these games compared to the usual pseudo-telepathy scenarios studied in quantum information is the notion of involvement [1, 15] , which allows one to define some interesting scenarios in noncooperative games and which exhibits novel features, e.g. unlimited separation. If a player participates in the game but is not involved (on a particular round) it means that their strategy is not taken into account when determining the win/lose outcome. However, they do receive a corresponding payoff.
Using these games one can build games with bounded personal utilities v0, v1 on O(log( 1 )) players ensuring
QSW (G ≤ , where CSW/QSW are the Classical/Quantum Social Welfares, respectively. The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we describe graph games which are the underlying non-local games used to define our games. In Sec. 3 we define a non-collaborative game as a modification of the collaborative games by introducing unequal payoffs corresponding to answers 0 and 1 of each player, and discuss the corresponding quantum perfect strategy. We consider a particular version of graph games from the cycle on five vertices. Sec. 4 discusses variations of non-collaborative games based on the cycle on five vertices. Finally, Sec. 5 shows how one can amplify the quantum advantage by adding a penalty for wrong answers and by increasing the number of players.
Graph games
Non-local games play a key role in Quantum Information theory. They can be viewed as a setting in which players that are not allowed to communicate receive some inputs and have to produce some outputs, and there is a winning/losing condition depending globally on their outputs for each input. Particular types of games are pseudo-telepathy games [5] which are games that can be won perfectly using quantum resources but that are impossible to win perfectly without communication when the players have access only to shared randomness. Multipartite collaborative games (M CG(G)) are a family of pseudo-telepathy games based on certain types of quantum states called graph states. The players are identified with vertices of the graph and have a binary input/output each with the winning/losing conditions built using the stabilisers of the graph states.
The combinatorial game 1 M CG with n players consists in asking the players questions: for each question q, each player i receives one bit qi as input and answers one bit ai. They can either all win or all lose depending on their answer, with winning/losing conditions described by a set {(q, I(q), b(q))} where • q ∈ {0, 1} n is a valid question in which each player i gets the bit qi and in the subgraph of the vertices corresponding to players receiving one, all vertices have even degree. Let I1 = {i, qi = 1} and G = G |I 1 , a question is valid if each vertex of G has an even number of neighbors in G
is a subset of players that are called 'involved' in the question as the sum (modulo 2) of their answers determines the winning/losing condition according to the bit b(q):
• b(q) is defined such that the players win the game when the question is q if the sum of the answers of the involved players is equal to the parity of the number of edges of the subgraph of the vertices corresponding to players receiving one: i∈I(q) ai = b(q) = |E(G )| mod 2. For instance the game associated to the cycle on 5 elements M CG(C5) is defined by
• When the question is q = 11111 (each player has input 1), the players lose if the binary sum of their answer is 0, i.e. 4 i=0 ai = 0 mod 2 , and win otherwise. • When the question contains 010 for three players corresponding to three adjacent vertices, the players lose if the binary sum of the answer of these three players is 1 i.e. ai−1 + ai + ai+1 = 0 mod 2 when q contains 0i−11i0i+1.
• The players win otherwise.
A variation of this game can be done by reducing the set of valid questions, for instance in the above set-up the questions of the second type have only three players "involved", so a first version could be to chose only 5 questions of the second type and give always 0 as advice to the non-involved players. This is the game studied as an example in [15] .
An important point is that the notion of involvement in M CG games is absent in unique games and introduces situations where the players might change their strategy (answer) without changing the winning/losing status of the global strategy.
To analyse these games and the strategies, one can imagine a scenario where there is one special player representing Nature who is playing against the other players. The strategy of Nature is therefore a probability distribution over the questions that we study here (as is standard in game theory) as a known function on the set of questions w : T → [0, 1] such that t∈T w(t) = 1. The games will be therefore defined by equipping the combinatorial game with a probability distribution over the questions.
Defining non-collaborative games
Like in multipartite collaborative graph games M CG(G), we associate a non-collaborative game N C(G) to each graph. We differentiate the payoff of the players using the value of their output: If the global answer wins in the non-local game, each player gets v1 if they answer 1 and v0 if they answer 0. If the global answer loses, they get 0.
To match the traditional terminology used in game theory the output from now on will be called strategy, and the input called type. The payoff is called utility and the social welfare is the average of the utilities over the players.
A non-collaborative game N C(G) is thus defined from M CG(G) as follows
• The considered types are T ⊂ {0, 1} n where n is the number of vertices of G.
• As in M CG, to each type t ∈ T corresponds an associated involved set I(t) of players, and an expected binary answer b(t).
• As in M CG, the losing set is
We say that the players using a strategy s, given a type t, collectively win the game when the sum of the local strategies of the involved players is equal to the requested binary answer modulo 2.
• the payoff function is:
Firstly we consider the cycle on five vertices C5. We define N C00(C5) based on the non-local game M CG(C5) studied in [1, 15] For questions which involve three players, both non-involved players have type 0 (see Figure 1 ).
Type
Involved set Binary answer Table 1 : N C 00 (G) game.
We consider the game with the type probability distribution w(t) = 1/6 for all the types. The quantum perfect strategy for N C(G) is obtained when the players each have a qubit from graph state |G [1] . Each player i measures their qubit according to their type ti, getting a quantum advice representing their part of the quantum strategy si. [1] From the study of M CG(G) we have Proof. The output of each quantum measurement provides uniformly all the possible answers.
Is the quantum pseudo-telepathy solution a Nash equilibrium?
As the players now have an incentive to answer 1, they can sacrifice always getting a good answer to maximize their utility. Indeed, in the previous game, each player is always involved when they get type 1 and with probability 1/2 when they get type 0; getting the wrong answer in that case only costs v0.
Without loss of generality we consider v1 ≥ v0. The players now have an incentive to answer 1, because they might be able to maximize their utility by allowing the non-zero probability of a wrong answer. Indeed, in the previous game, N C00(C5), if the player gets type 1 then they are certain that they are involved, and they won't gain by defecting (not following advice). However, if their type is 0, then the probability of them being involved is 1/2, and so there is a fifty percent chance that they will benefit from always answering 1 while not compromizing the winning combination. Getting the wrong answer in that case only costs v0.
inv (ti, si) be the probability for the player i who gets type ti and advice si to be involved Then, in N C(G), the quantum advice gives a belief-invariant Nash equilibrium iff
Proof. If the advice is si = 1 then the winning payoff is already v1. Consider the case when player i is given the advice si = 0 (which would lead to payoff v0 in the winning case). If the player defects then the difference of utility is −v0p
. So the strategy is a Nash-equilibrium when (1 − p
inv (ti, 0). This inequality has to hold for all types and all players.
For N C00(C5), p (i) inv (0, 0) = 1/2 and therefore the quantum nonlocal strategy is an equilibrium only when v0/v1 ≥ 1/2.
One important characteristic of an equilibrium is the Social Welfare, which is the average utility of the players.
As a direct consequence of Theorem 1 the average social welfare of the quantum strategy is independent on the graph
Note that the non collaborative games defined have a special feature that we call guaranteed value: in any run of the game players following the quantum strategy receive their expected payoff with probability 1.
Some versions of N C(C 5 )
In this section we study the game N C00(C5) and then introduce a number of modifications in order to improve the quantum advantage (ratio of quantum social welfare to correlated social welfare) and also to symmetrize the game such that the players get 0 and 1 with same probability or have the same probability of being involved regardless of whether their type is 0 or 1.
Study of N C 00 (C 5 )
Pure Nash equilibria can be described by local functions: each player having one local type bit and one strategy bit to produce, can locally act as follows:
The set of pure Nash equilibria depends on the ratio v0/v1. The are 20/25/40 pure Nash equilibria (4/4/6 up to symmetry) when v0/v1 lies within the interval [0, 1/3], [1/3, 1/2] or [1/2, 1] respectively (see Table 2 ). We can see that most of these equilibria (all of them when v0/v1 ≥ 1/2) correspond to local functions winning for the 5 types.
Local functions
When v0 = 2/3 and v1 = 1 then the quantum social welfare of the pseudotelepathy strategy is QSW = 0.83 whereas the best classical social welfare CSW = 0.77.
As noted in section 3.1 the probability of being involved in N C00 is (p(1, s) = 1 and p(0, s) = 1/2 and the quantum pseudotelepathy measurements strategy is an equilibrium if v0/v1 ≥ 1/2. Simililar behavior can be seen with Pareto equilibria (ones in which local utility cannot improve without reducing the outcome of someone else): see Appendix.
Recall that the characteristic feature of N C00(C5) is that each player has unequal probabilities of getting different types. The game can be symmetrized by changing the types of the non-involved players from 00 to 01, as shown in the next section.
Comments on N C 01 (C 5 )
We define a second variant from M CG(C5) : N C01(C5) where any player gets the types 0 and 1 with probability 1/2 by adding an extra 1 for a non-involved player in the types so that Ti = 0i−11i0i+11i+20i+3: see Table 3 .
If the type probability distribution is w(t) = 1/6 for all the types, then one can see that any player is involved with probability 2/3 whether their input is 0 or 1, i.e. p inv (1, 0) = 2/3. Hence, by Theorem 2, the quantum strategy of MCG produces a Nash equilibrium iff v0/v1 ≥ 1/3. Thus, one of the benefits of this variant is that quantum Nash equilibria exist at a lower ratio v0/v1.
Note that in this version each player is getting a perfect random bit as advice : p(a = 1) = p(a = 0) = 1/2. When v0 = 2/3 and v1 = 1 then the quantum social welfare of the pseudotelepathy strategy is QSW = 0.83 whereas the best classical social welfare is CSW = 0.78.
Type
Involved set Binary answer 
Comments on N C 00,0 (C 5 )
A modification of a different kind consists in adding more questions from the stabiliser. As the first example of this kind we define a game N C00,0(C5), where the additional family of questions has four involved players with the non-involved player getting type 0, as specified by Table 4 .
Type
Involved set Binary answer Table 4 : N C 00,0 (G) game.
For v1 = 1, v0 = 2 3 , and the probability distribution w(Ta) = 3 13 , w(Ti 1 ) = w(Ti 2 ) = 1 13 we get a CSW of 0.72 versus a QSW of 0.83
Note that each player gets types 0 and 1 with different probabilities. In fact, it is simple to show that no choice of w1, w2 and w3 can make these probabilities equal. However, it is possible to modify the set of types so that equality becomes possible, as shown in the following.
4.4
Comments on N C 00,01,0 (C 5 )
We increase the set of types using other questions from the stabiliser: We define a game N C00,01,0(C5) for which with a suitable choice of probability distribution the players get 0 and 1 with the same probability.
Type
Involved set Binary answer Table 5 : N C 00,01,0 (G) game.
We consider this game with type probability distributions given by w(Ta) = 3/13, w(ti 1 ) = 1/26, w(Ti 2 ) = 1/26 and w(Ti 3 ) = 1/13.
The involvement probabilities satisfy Pinv(1) > Pinv(0) = 8/13 and the best classical Social wellfare with v0 = 2/3, v1 = 1 is CSW = 0.72 versus a QSW of 0.83
Note that even though the types Ti 2 and Ti 3 are similar, the involved sets and thus the utilities are different. However, if one wants to restrict to scenarios in which the utility can be deterministically determined from the type, one can just add an extra player with a type allowing to distinguish the different cases and with utility the average utility of the other players independently of his/her action.
Quantum vs correlation separation
In [2] it is asked as an open question whether the separation between classical and quantum social welfare is bounded. We show in this section how two families of amplification techniques can increase the separation by adding a penalty for wrong answers and then by increasing the number of players.
Wrong answer penalty
A possible technique is to penalize bad answers more, using the fact that classical functions always produce a bad answer for some question. Instead of getting 0 when losing we generalize so that each player gets −Ngv1 if they answer 1 and −Ngv0 if they answer 0, where Ng can be seen as the penalty for giving a wrong answer. . Therefore the classical social welfare decreases linearly with the penalty while the quantum average social welfare remains v 1 +v 0 2 .
Distributed parallel repetition
The distributed parallel composition of nonlocal games appears in [11] for the study of non signaling correlations and also in [7] where it is called k-fold repetition. k groups of players play at the same time and they win collectively if all the groups win their game. Theorem 3. There exists games with bounded personal utilities v0, v1 on O(log( 1 )) players ensuring CSW (G) QSW (G ≤ for the ratio best classical social welfare over quantum social welfare with guaranteed value.
Proof. It is easy to bound the utility in these settings as for any strategy in a repeated game. If a player p is involved in the strategy Sj but is not involved in the strategy Si of another group then his utility is conditioned by the fact that the Si strategy wins to receive a positive utility and
As the quantum strategy obtained from following the nonlocal advice always wins, the QSW remains unchanged whereas the CSW decreases. For instance CSW (k−fold N C00(C5)) = 5 6 k CSW (N C00(C5)).
Therefore using these games one can build games with bounded personal utilities v0, v1 on O(log( 1 )) players ensuring CSW (G) QSW (G ≤
Conclusion
We have used properties of multipartite graph games to define conflict of interest games, and shown that by combining such games the ratio classical social welfare / quantum social welfare can go to zero. One can easily extend to stabilizer games [7] to have any number of types and possible strategies. As pointed out by [2] , quantum advice equilibria can be reached without needing a trusted mediator, furthermore they ensure privacy as they are belief invariant. Some other features may be emphasized if we define Nash equilibria using pseudotelepathy games: such situations ensure a guaranteed utility and they are also better when analysing the maximal minimal utility. It may be interesting to investigate further how this guaranteed value property for some quantum equilibria can be used. On the other hand it would also be interesting to investigate how relaxing the guaranteed win requirement might allow to increase the QSW even further.
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